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GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT:  HOW 
THE FIRST CIRCUIT IN ACLU OF 
MASSACHUSETTS V. U.S. CONFERENCE OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS FAILED TO PREVENT A 
GOVERNMENT AGENCY FROM 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONTRACTING 
ITS DUTIES TO A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION 
ANNA M. LASHLEY* 
When the government delegates its discretionary power to religious 
institutions, it violates a fundamental right guaranteed by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution—the freedom from government 
entanglement with religion.  The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
was written to protect religious freedom from intrusion by the government by 
preventing, to the extent possible, the imposition of either the church or the 
government into the confines of the other.  This separation between church and 
state is essential to preserve the liberty of the American people and to ensure 
that the nation stays true to its Constitution. 
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
violated the Establishment Clause when it formed a master contract with 
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).  This contract 
authorized the USCCB to allocate federal funds to subcontractors pursuant 
to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, a discretionary duty 
originally assigned to the HHS.   
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Communication, 2010, Virginia Tech.  Many thanks to Professor Stephen Wermiel for 
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the way, even when I got a little crazy.  
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This Comment demonstrates that such a delegation of discretionary power 
violates all three of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests:  the 
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test.  The master contract 
between the HHS and the USCCB was a direct violation of Americans’ First 
Amendment rights.  Until courts take action to prevent such contracts from 
being formed in the future and limit the type of business interactions in which 
the government and religious institutions may engage, the American people are 
at risk of similar unconstitutional relationships being formed.  Otherwise, this 
continued entanglement between the government and religious institutions will 
erode the religious liberty the nation has worked so hard to maintain and 
protect throughout its history. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ........................................................................................ 609 
I. Background .................................................................................. 612 
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause ........................................................ 612 
1. The Lemon test and its evolution ................................. 614 
2. The endorsement test .................................................. 619 
3. The coercion test ......................................................... 624 
B. President Bush’s Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives ............................................................................ 626 
1. The rules and regulations ............................................ 627 
2. The Court’s refusal to analyze the FBCI ..................... 628 
3. The FBCI in effect today .............................................. 629 
C. Taking the FBCI a Step Further:  ACLU of 
Massachusetts v. Sebelius ...................................................... 630 
1. The underlying statute:  The Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act .............................................................. 630 
2. The formation of the contract between the HHS 
and the USCCB ............................................................ 631 
3. The lawsuit ................................................................... 632 
II. A Master Contract Between the Government and a Religious 
Institution Fails All Establishment Clause Tests and 
Violates the First Amendment ................................................. 632 
A. Master Contracts Are Not Comparable to the 
Subcontracts Permitted Under the FBCI Because They 
Delegate More Power and Are Not Restricted by Rules 
and Regulations ................................................................. 634 
B. Master Contracts Fail All Three Establishment Clause 
Tests ................................................................................... 636 
1. Applying the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test ..................... 637 
2. Applying the endorsement test ................................... 642 
3. Applying the coercion analysis .................................... 644 
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 646 
 
LASHLEY.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:48 PM 
2013] GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT 609 
INTRODUCTION 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment specifies that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”1  Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court and scholars 
have interpreted this clause to mean that there must be separation 
between religion and the government.2  Although the First 
Amendment does not explicitly mention this separation, the Court 
has concluded that there is no question that the First Amendment 
established that church and state should be separated.3  While 
Thomas Jefferson discussed the concept of a “wall of separation” 
between church and state,4 the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that “total separation is not possible” and that “[s]ome relationship 
between the government and religious organizations is inevitable.”5  
However, the Court has determined that the Establishment Clause at 
least means that the “government may not promote or affiliate itself 
with any religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate 
among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, 
may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, and may 
not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.”6  In 
addition, any idea of a “wall” between church and state is 
“substantially breached” when the government puts discretionary 
governmental powers in the hands of religious bodies.7  
While the Supreme Court has made it clear that giving 
governmental power to religious institutions is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause, the federal government frequently delegates 
such power.  In 2001, for example, President George W. Bush created 
the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI), which ensured 
that faith-based organizations could subcontract to receive federal 
                                                          
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122–23, 126–27 
(1982) (invoking Thomas Jefferson’s concept of a “wall” of separation and 
discussing Supreme Court precedent analyzing the purposes of the Religion 
Clauses and the ability of religion and government to coexist); Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (asserting that the separation of church and 
state “must be complete and unequivocal”).  
 3. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312. 
 4. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 122−23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (highlighting prior Supreme 
Court rulings that did not require total separation between church and state). 
 6. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
590−91 (1989) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 7. See, e.g., Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123, 127 (holding that a state statute that gave 
churches the right to determine whether applicants could obtain liquor licenses 
violated the Establishment Clause). 
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funding to provide public social services.8  The Supreme Court has 
yet to rule on the constitutionality of such subcontracts;9 however, 
allowing religious organizations to administer these services has 
become a common and accepted practice.10 
A novel type of contract sparked debate in 2009, when the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided ACLU of 
Massachusetts v. Sebelius.11  The plaintiffs alleged an Establishment 
Clause violation after the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) formed a “master contract” with the U.S. Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).12  This contract conferred to the 
USCCB the authority to perform the duties of the HHS in allocating 
federal funds to subcontractors pursuant to the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000.13  The contract also gave the USCCB the 
discretionary power to decide which organizations would receive a 
subcontract granting federal funds to provide services for trafficking 
victims.14  Rather than addressing the larger constitutional issue of 
these types of master contracts generally, the parties formed their 
arguments around the specifics of the HHS-USCCB contract.15  The 
district court therefore only analyzed this specific contract and found 
that both the contract itself, as well as the way in which the USCCB 
was performing under the contract, unconstitutional.16  The court 
ruled this way because the USCCB awarded subcontracts only to 
organizations that agreed not to use the federal funds to provide 
victim services that conflicted with the USCCB’s religious beliefs.17  
                                                          
 8. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001), reprinted in 3 
U.S.C. § 21 app. at 13–14 (2012). 
 9. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 605 (2007) 
(plurality opinion) (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the FBCI after finding 
that the respondent lacked standing); see also infra Part I.B.2. 
 10. See Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts?  The Legal and Political Future of 
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 186−88 (2002) 
(discussing the long history of allocation of federal funds to religious 
organizations that provide social services); see also infra Part I.B.3 (describing the 
prevalence of the FBCI). 
 11. 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of Mass. 
v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 12. Id. at 477–78. 
 13. Id. at 476–77. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 488; see, e.g., Complaint, Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (No. 1:09-cv-
10038), 2009 WL 8500122; Defendant’s Answer, Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (No. 
1:09-cv-10038), 2010 WL 7940343. 
 16. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (finding a violation because the HHS 
delegated authority to a religious group “to impose religiously based restrictions 
in the expenditure of taxpayer funds, and thereby impliedly endorsed [their] 
religious beliefs”). 
 17. See id. at 487–88 (specifying that subcontractors could not use the funds to 
provide victims contraceptives or abortion services). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit avoided analyzing the 
constitutionality of the formation of the contract when it reversed the 
district court’s decision as moot.18 
Although this case provided a potential opportunity for a court to 
determine the constitutionality of these master contracts between the 
government and religious institutions, the issue remains undecided, 
and there is nothing to prevent similar contracts in the future.  While 
not officially deemed constitutional, subcontracts between 
government agencies and religious organizations have become an 
accepted practice.19  Yet, more powerful and potentially detrimental 
master contracts have introduced new Establishment Clause issues.   
This Comment argues that there is a constitutional limit on the 
extent to which faith-based organizations can administer or 
participate in federally funded social-service programs.  It advances 
the notion that general master contracts between the government 
and a religious institution, which give the institution the authority to 
allocate federal funds to subcontractors pursuant to a legislative act, 
are a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the background of the 
Establishment Clause and the different tests the Supreme Court has 
developed to determine whether the Clause has been violated.  This 
Part also provides information about the creation, rules, and 
regulations of the FBCI.  Finally, this Part takes a more in-depth look 
at the details surrounding ACLU of Massachusetts v. Sebelius.   
Part II contends that any master contract between the government 
and a religious institution violates the First Amendment.  It discusses 
the differences between these master contracts and the subcontracts 
that are formed under the FBCI in order to demonstrate why the 
master contracts are not valid under the FBCI.  This Part also argues 
that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the district 
court mistakenly focused its Establishment Clause analysis on the 
restriction the USCCB imposed because, under several Establishment 
Clause tests, these contracts are unconstitutional regardless of 
whether such restrictions exist. 
                                                          
 18. See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 48, 53 
(1st Cir. 2013) (declaring the case moot on several grounds, including that “there 
[was] literally no controversy left for the court to decide” because the contract had 
expired, and the obligations between the parties had therefore ended). 
 19. See Lin et al., supra note 10 (highlighting the reasoning behind federal 
funding for religious organizations); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the 
establishment of the FBCI program, the Court’s refusal to rule on its 
constitutionality, and its prevalence today). 
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In conclusion, this Comment suggests that the role of religious 
institutions and organizations, when it comes to receiving federal 
funding, must be limited to providing services as a subcontractor 
pursuant to the FBCI.  Any extension of authority beyond that of 
subcontractors, such as a general master contract, is 
constitutionally prohibited. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
In writing and signing the Constitution, the Framers sought to 
create laws of the nation to protect the people and preserve their 
liberty.20  The government has always acknowledged the role of 
religion in American culture,21 and the United States has a history 
and tradition of widespread religious diversity.22  The language of the 
First Amendment reflects the desires of early Americans to abolish 
conditions and practices limiting religious freedom “in order to 
preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity.”23  Fearing that 
a new government would impose the same religious dictatorship that 
they fled from in England, the American people realized that 
religious liberty could be best achieved if the government was 
prohibited from intruding on the religious beliefs of any individual.24  
Accordingly, the religion provisions in the First Amendment were 
intended to provide this protection.25 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
success of these religion provisions:  “The structure of our government 
has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal 
                                                          
 20. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (recognizing that the First 
Amendment conveyed the Framers’ objective to protect the people from 
“governmental intrusion on religious liberty”). 
 21. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–78 (1984) (highlighting Supreme 
Court precedent and the religious practices of the Framers of the Constitution to 
emphasize the longstanding presence of religion in American culture). 
 22. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 589 
(1989) (noting the “[s]ectarian differences among various Christian denominations 
[that] were central to the origins of our Republic” and how people of various 
religious faiths have made the United States their home). 
 23. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (referring to the First Amendment language declaring 
that Congress “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)). 
 24. See id. at 8−13 (providing historical examples of religious oppression that led 
to the adoption of the First Amendment, such as penalizing absences from 
government-established churches). 
 25. Id. at 8. 
LASHLEY.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:48 PM 
2013] GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT 613 
institutions from religious interference.  On the other hand, it has 
secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.”26 
The Supreme Court, in its decades-long analysis of the 
Establishment Clause, has looked to the country’s history and the 
Framers’ intent in order to determine the meaning of the Clause.27  
The Court has concluded that the Establishment Clause was intended 
to protect against three main evils:  “sponsorship, financial support, 
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”28  The 
purpose of the Clause is to prevent, to the extent possible, the 
intrusion of either the church or the government into the confines of 
the other.29  According to the Court, the key principle in any judicial 
analysis of the Establishment Clause is that the “First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion.”30 
A separation between church and state, although not explicitly 
mentioned in the First Amendment, is implied.31  However, the Court 
has struggled to settle on the required degree of separation in light of 
its recognition that absolute separation is not possible.32  The 
Supreme Court is tasked with the duty of drawing the requisite line of 
separation as issues arise.33  The Court has explained that the line-
drawing process is very difficult, and has described the guidance of 
the Establishment Clause as “a blurred, indistinct, and variable 
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship” between the government and religion.34  When 
                                                          
 26. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871). 
 27. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122–23, 126–27 (1982) 
(discussing the purpose of the Establishment Clause and how Thomas Jefferson’s 
view of the separation of church and state should be applied); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (analyzing the “opaque” language of the Free Exercise 
Clause to determine the Framers’ intended meaning); Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 162–64 (1878) (utilizing Jefferson’s own language to understand the 
concept of separateness). 
 28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 
668 (1970)). 
 29. See id. at 614 (reiterating the Establishment Clause’s goal of preventing the 
entanglement of church and state, but recognizing that total separation is impossible). 
 30. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (using 
precedent to explain the importance of religious neutrality to build tolerance and 
respect for any and all religions). 
 31. See supra notes 3−5 and accompanying text. 
 32. See supra notes 3−5 and accompanying text (noting that religious practices 
date back to the Framers of the Constitution, and realizing the historical importance 
of both church and state in American culture). 
 33. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (asserting that because the Establishment 
Clause’s language “is at best opaque,” it is the Court’s task to determine the 
scope of the Clause). 
 34. Id. at 614. 
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analyzing Establishment Clause issues case-by-case, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that no single test or criterion can be applied to 
adequately analyze every Establishment Clause issue.35  Instead, the 
Court has assessed issues in several ways, primarily employing 
three main tests:  the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the 
coercion test.36 
1. The Lemon test and its evolution 
One of the Establishment Clause tests courts employ is the three-
part test first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.37  The case involved 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provided state aid to 
nonpublic schools, including church-affiliated elementary and 
secondary schools.38  The Court acknowledged the history of the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and enunciated that any 
Establishment Clause analysis must consider the cumulative criteria 
that have developed in the jurisprudence over the years.39 
The Court concluded that the precedent garnered three primary 
questions, which in turn created three prongs that government action 
must meet in order to be constitutional:  “First, the statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the 
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”40  The Court emphasized that, when analyzing the third 
prong, courts “must examine the character and purposes of the 
institutions that are benefited [by the government action], the nature 
of the aid . . . provide[d], and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority” that results from the 
government action.41  To pass the test, the government action at issue 
must satisfy all three prongs.42 
                                                          
 35. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678−79 (1984) (“In our modern, complex 
society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage 
diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the 
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court.”). 
 36. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 154 (5th Cir. 1991) (identifying the 
different tools used in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
recognizing “that there is no one readily and easily applicable test”). 
 37. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 38. Id. at 606−07. 
 39. Id. at 612. 
 40. Id. at 612−13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see also Ashley M. Bell, Comment “God Save This Honorable 
Court”:  How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the 
Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1281–90 (2001) 
(discussing the evolution of the three-prong standard). 
 41. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. 
 42. See id. at 612–13. 
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In applying the three-prong analysis to the Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island statutes, the Court held that both state programs 
violated the Establishment Clause.43  It was clear that the statutes had 
the secular purpose of enhancing the quality and standards of all 
schools;44 however, problems arose with the question of 
entanglement.45  The Court considered each statute separately and 
determined “that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship” 
resulting from both states’ statutory programs of aid for nonpublic 
schools involved impermissible entanglement of church and 
state.46  The Court reasoned that both statutes required continued 
state action and supervision, as well as annual appropriations, and 
therefore presented a risk of divisive political activity along 
religious lines.47 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the Lemon test 
to examine Establishment Clause questions for many years; however, 
the Court has since modified the original test.48  The Court first 
transformed the Lemon test in 1997 in Agostini v. Felton49 in order to 
consolidate previously disparate considerations.50  Then, in 2000, the 
Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms51 clarified the changes made in 
Agostini and fleshed out the test’s second prong.52  Both cases 
involved state programs that offered government aid to public and 
private schools, including private religious schools.  Agostini 
addressed a New York City program implemented under Title I of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that made public 
school teachers available to provide remedial education to 
disadvantaged children in all public and private schools throughout 
                                                          
 43. See id. at 613–14 (charging that the statutes involved excessive entanglement 
between government and religion because the statutes were not aimed at advancing 
religion at specific schools, but instead were administered “to enhance the quality of 
the secular education in all schools covered by compulsory attendance laws”). 
 44. Id. at 613. 
 45. See id. at 614. 
 46. Id. at 614–22. 
 47. Id. at 622−23. 
 48. See Lin et al., supra note 10, at 200−04 (documenting the transformation of 
the Lemon test). 
 49. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 50. See id. at 232–35 (modifying the Lemon test to analyze a New York City 
program that used federal funds to provide remedial education to 
disadvantaged children). 
 51. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 52. See id. at 807–08 (plurality opinion) (illuminating the legal analysis the 
Court used in Agostini and applying it to an Establishment Clause claim against 
state and federal school aid programs that resulted in federal funding being 
given to religious schools in Louisiana); see also Lin et al., supra note 10, at 202–
04 (explaining the Mitchell test and Justice O’Connor’s view that the plurality 
focused too heavily on neutrality). 
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the city.53  Mitchell focused on a Louisiana program implemented 
under Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement 
Act, which allowed federal funds to be used to provide educational 
materials and equipment to public and private schools.54  In these 
cases, the Lemon test was reduced to the first two prongs; the third 
prong, “excessive entanglement,” was combined with the second 
prong and became one of several factors55 relevant to determining 
the “principal effect” of the government action.56  The Court made 
this change after recognizing that many of the considerations 
evaluated under the entanglement prong were also contemplated 
when determining the principal effect of the government action.57 
The amended Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test analyzes many different 
factors.  Similar to the original test, the first prong is whether there is 
a secular purpose.58  While the Court retained the second prong from 
the original test—whether the primary effect of the action is 
advancing or hindering religion—it delineated three primary criteria 
to evaluate this question.59 
The first criterion is whether the government action resulted in 
government indoctrination.60  The result of this inquiry depends on 
whether any indoctrination that occurred could be reasonably 
credited to governmental action.61  Courts often turn to the 
“principle of neutrality” to decide whether the government action 
resulted in any noticeable indoctrination.62  Under this neutrality 
analysis, courts will sustain aid that was presented to a broad range of 
groups or persons without respect to their religion.63  “If the 
religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for 
governmental aid . . . [and] the government is offering assistance to 
recipients who provide . . . a broad range of indoctrination, the 
government itself is not thought responsible for any particular 
                                                          
 53. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209–14. 
 54. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801–02 (plurality opinion). 
 55. Other relevant factors courts employ to decipher the primary effect of the 
government action include whether it results in government indoctrination, whether 
aid recipients are defined by religion, and whether individuals have a genuine 
independent choice.  See id. at 808−11. 
 56. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232−33 (determining that the entanglement inquiry 
of the Lemon test was instead a criterion to determine the primary effect of the 
government action). 
 57. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion). 
 58. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233. 
 59. Id. at 233–34. 
 60. Id. at 234. 
 61. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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indoctrination.”64  In Agostini and Mitchell, the Court assessed whether 
any religious indoctrination that occurred in religious schools could 
be attributed to the government programs at issue.65  The Court in 
both cases held that government aid directly assisting religious 
schools did not in itself generate government indoctrination.66  
Additionally, the particular aid programs did not result in 
indoctrination because the aid was offered on neutral terms to any 
schools that furthered a legitimate secular purpose.67  The 
governments in both New York and Louisiana implemented new 
programs, improved existing platforms in the schools,68 and 
allocated the aid based on neutral criteria.69  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court concluded that neither program led to 
impermissible government indoctrination.70 
The second relevant criterion to the primary effect analysis is 
whether the government action defines aid recipients with respect to 
religion.71  Neutrality is also a factor under this criterion in 
determining the permissibility of the disbursed aid.72  Specifically, the 
issue is whether the criteria for selecting or allocating the aid create a 
financial incentive for those seeking the aid or services to choose 
religion over a secular alternative.73  If a court finds that aid was 
allocated based on neutral, secular factors that neither favored nor 
disfavored religion and that the aid was made available to multiple 
beneficiaries—both nonreligious and religious—on a 
                                                          
 64. Id. at 809−10. 
 65. Id. at 809; see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230–31. 
 66. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809−11 (plurality opinion) (allowing 
governmental assistance for legitimate secular purposes); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 
230 (determining that placing employees in parochial schools does not, as a 
matter of law, result in indoctrination). 
 67. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809−10 (plurality opinion) (inspecting the Louisiana 
program); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231, 234–35 (reviewing the New York City program). 
 68. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 831 (plurality opinion) (purporting that the 
Louisiana program in question channeled federal funds to public and private 
elementary and secondary schools to employ “secular, neutral, and nonideological 
programs”); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35 (emphasizing that the program sent 
teachers to elementary and secondary schools to provide remedial education to 
disadvantaged children). 
 69. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829 (plurality opinion) (elucidating that the amount 
of funds distributed to each participating school was determined by student 
enrollment); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229 (clarifying that teachers are made available to 
all eligible children, regardless of where they choose to attend school). 
 70. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230. 
 71. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230–32, 234 (declaring that New York’s Title I 
program does not advance religion, in part because it does not decide who receives 
aid through reference to religious beliefs). 
 72. See id. at 231. 
 73. Id. 
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nondiscriminatory basis, then no financial incentive was present.74  
Also relevant to this analysis is whether a genuinely independent 
choice is available to the individuals receiving services or benefiting 
from the aid.75  If the individuals seeking services are offered a wide 
range of providers—both religious and secular—from which they can 
choose to receive services, then it is more likely that the aid was made 
available without regard to the recipients’ religion.76 
In Agostini, the Court noted that the New York City program made 
educational services available to all children who met the eligibility 
requirements—regardless of their religious beliefs.77  Also essential in 
the Court’s determination was that eligible children were able to pick 
where they wished to receive this education from a broad range of 
secular and religious options.78  Eligible students received Title I 
services based on criteria which neither favored nor disfavored 
religion, regardless of individual religious beliefs.79  With no financial 
incentive to modify religious beliefs, the Court held that the program 
did not distinguish aid recipients based on religion.80 
Similarly, the Court in Mitchell considered government aid 
allocated to a religious institution a result of the private choice of the 
individuals who would benefit from or receive the aid.81  The Court 
determined that any aid ultimately distributed to a private religious 
school through the Louisiana program was grounded solely on the 
independent and private choices of parents as to where their 
children would attend school.82  Additionally, because the aid was 
generated based on the size of the school’s enrollment—which was 
determined by the independent choice of parents—the program 
allocated aid on the basis of neutral, secular criteria, and made the 
aid available to religious and secular beneficiaries on a 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the Court has, 
on multiple occasions, considered whether government aid to religious institutions 
was the result of an individual’s genuinely independent and private choice). 
 76. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225−26 (noting that federal funding went to the 
religious schools only as a result of the genuinely independent choice of those 
students deciding between religious and secular schools); see also Lin et al., supra 
note 10, at 202–03 (discussing, in depth, the Mitchell plurality’s interpretation of 
the Agostini modifications to the Lemon test, and explaining that if the 
distribution of aid is determined by the private choice of individuals, then that 
aid would be considered neutral). 
 77. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 82. Id. at 830. 
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nondiscriminatory basis.83  Thus, there was no incentive for aid 
recipients to choose religious over nonreligious schools.84 
Finally, the last criterion used to evaluate the primary effect of the 
government action is whether it creates excessive government 
entanglement.85  While entanglement is important to consider, not 
all entanglements have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion:  
in order to constitute an Establishment Clause violation, the 
government entanglement must be “excessive.”86  A court’s 
entanglement analysis relies on multiple factors; however, one 
commonly cited example of excessive entanglement is when constant 
government monitoring and surveillance is needed to ensure that 
religion is not given preference.87  In contrast to the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Lemon, where it found excessive 
entanglement because the statute required constant government 
surveillance in order to guarantee that states were properly 
administering programs,88 the Court in Agostini found that 
monthly visits by public supervisors to observe the Title I teachers 
were sufficient to ensure that only secular material was taught, yet 
did not reach the level of “excessive” entanglement.89 
2. The endorsement test 
While the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test is a popular Establishment 
Clause interpretive tool, it is not the only one used to determine 
whether government action has violated the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment.  The Supreme Court has declined to utilize only a 
singular test when assessing whether an Establishment Clause 
violation has occurred, and in some instances, the Lemon-Agostini-
Mitchell test cannot adequately answer the question at hand or fully 
address the issues.90  In these situations, courts look to alternative 
                                                          
 83. Id. at 829. 
 84. Id. at 830. 
 85. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–34. 
 86. Id. at 233 (clarifying that some entanglement, or interaction between church 
and state, is inevitable and tolerable). 
 87. See id.  Compare, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616–17 (1988) 
(holding that some instances of minimal monitoring do not rise to the level of 
excessive entanglement, such as government review of educational materials and 
inspection of centers where programs are carried out), with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (identifying a state program as excessively entangled because it 
required constant state surveillance to ensure that subsidized teachers complied with 
the Establishment Clause when choosing their teaching texts and materials). 
 88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622−23. 
 89. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234−35. 
 90. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (articulating the Supreme 
Court’s inability to apply one test or look at only certain criteria when assessing an 
alleged Establishment Clause violation); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 
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methods of analysis.  One recurring Establishment Clause question 
that the Supreme Court began to pay particularly close attention to, 
and that the Lemon test was not particularly useful for assessing, was 
whether government action had the purpose of endorsing religion.91 
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,92 Justice O’Connor 
established what is now known as the “endorsement test.”93  The case 
involved a Christmas display that the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island 
constructed at a park in the heart of the city’s shopping district.94  
The park was owned by a nonprofit organization.95  Within the 
Christmas display was a Santa Clause house, a “SEASONS 
GREETINGS” banner, a Christmas tree, and a nativity scene.96  The 
plaintiffs sued the Mayor of Pawtucket, alleging that the nativity scene 
violated the Establishment Clause.97  The majority of the Court briefly 
applied the Lemon test and concluded that the inclusion of the 
nativity scene satisfied all three prongs of the test, and therefore 
found that there was no Establishment Clause violation.98 
The majority opinion’s analysis in Lynch did not provide guidance 
for subsequent cases assessing the constitutionality of the 
government’s display of objects with religious significance.99  
However, in evaluating the legality of the government display, Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence articulated a “sound analytical framework” 
for the use of religious objects that focused on the notion of 
endorsement rather than the Lemon test.100  Justice O’Connor 
                                                          
(1983) (declining to apply the Lemon test in analyzing whether state legislative prayer 
violates the Establishment Clause); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 230, 252 (1982) 
(concluding that the Lemon test was not relevant or necessary to assess the 
constitutionality of a statute requiring religious organizations that receive less than 
fifty percent of funding from members to register and report to the state). 
 91. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
592−94 (1989) (submitting that endorsement was a new area of focus and that the 
majority opinion in Lynch was not useful in scrutinizing endorsement in situations in 
which the government displayed objects with religious implications). 
 92. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 93. See id. at 688−89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message 
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community . . . .”).  The endorsement test is now seen to be the controlling standard 
for Establishment Clause cases.  See Nontaxpayer Standing, Religious Favoritism, and the 
Distribution of Government Benefits:  The Outer Bounds of the Endorsement Test, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1999, 2005 n.50 (2010). 
 94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 670–71. 
 97. Id. at 671. 
 98. See id. at 684–85 (approving the display’s secular purpose, lack of religious 
advancement, and lack of excessive entanglement). 
 99. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
592−94 (1989) (pointing out that the majority opinion in Lynch was “none too clear” 
and not useful in delineating constitutional and unconstitutional endorsements). 
 100. Id. at 595. 
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explained that she wrote her concurrence “to suggest a 
clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine” and 
particularly how the Lemon test related to the principles preserved 
in the Establishment Clause.101  The endorsement test was 
necessary, according to Justice O’Connor, because focusing on 
endorsement elucidated the analysis of the Lemon test and made 
the Establishment Clause doctrine more clear-cut.102 
The primary question in this endorsement analysis is whether the 
government action is perceived to endorse a particular religion.103  As 
a result, courts must look at what viewers would fairly understand to 
be the purpose of the government action.104  The test is whether a 
reasonable adherent of a particular religion would feel as though her 
or his religion was being privileged as an insider or as “favored 
members of the political community,” or whether a reasonable 
nonadherent of the religion would feel as though she or he was an 
outsider and another religion was being imposed or endorsed by the 
government action.105 
Part of the endorsement analysis is assessing whether the 
government has conveyed or attempted to convey a message that 
religion—or a particular religious belief—is favored or preferred.106  
The Court has consistently determined that government 
endorsement is unconstitutional when government action favors 
religious belief over disbelief or shows preference for particular 
religious beliefs.107 
Justice O’Connor applied her test in Lynch and concluded that 
because the nativity scene is seen as a traditional symbol of Christmas, 
and not just of Christianity, and because it was combined with several 
purely secular symbols in the display, a reasonable person would not 
                                                          
 101. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687−89. 
 102. See id. at 689 (illustrating how political divisiveness can evince government 
endorsement, but insisting that the inquiry should focus not on the divisiveness but 
on the character of the activity causing the divisiveness). 
 103. Id. at 690. 
 104. Id. at 692. 
 105. Id. at 688. 
 106. Id. at 690 (explaining that the test involves both objective and subjective 
measures of the government’s intended and perceived message). 
 107. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 601 (1989) (concluding that an indoor nativity display had the effect of 
endorsing a patently Christian message and therefore violated the Establishment 
Clause); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (finding that a Texas 
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violated the Establishment Clause); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (holding that the primary purpose of 
a Louisiana act was to advance a particular religious belief, and therefore the act 
endorsed religion and violated the Establishment Clause). 
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perceive the display as an endorsement of Christian beliefs.108  While 
four Justices in Lynch dissented with the outcome of the majority and 
concurring opinions, the dissent did mention that Justice O’Connor 
was correct that the controlling question in the case was whether the 
State had endorsed religion and that her opinion provided a helpful 
analytical tool for considering this issue.109 
The endorsement test has been central in striking down multiple 
government actions for violating the Establishment Clause.  For 
example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,110 
the Supreme Court resisted the notion that the Lynch holding led to 
the inference that all nativity displays were constitutional and instead 
applied Justice O’Connor’s endorsement analysis.111  The case 
concerned two holiday displays in downtown Pittsburgh.112  One was a 
Christian nativity scene placed on the grand staircase of the 
Allegheny County Courthouse and contained a banner proclaiming, 
in Latin, “Glory to God in the highest.”113  The second display was an 
eighteen-foot menorah placed outside the City-County Building next 
to the city’s forty-five-foot Christmas tree and a sign that saluted 
liberty.114  The Allegheny Court distinguished Lynch, noting that in 
Lynch there was no Establishment Clause violation because the 
nativity scene was a traditional symbol of Christmas displayed with 
other purely secular symbols, but the nativity scene in Allegheny stood 
alone.115  The Court found that the government, in placing this 
display in the main part of the courthouse, was sending “an 
unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian 
praise to God that is the [display’s] religious message.”116  
Additionally, including a sign naming the Roman Catholic 
organization that donated the nativity scene only made this 
endorsement seem more likely.117  On the other hand, a plurality 
found that displaying the menorah was not an Establishment Clause 
violation because it was placed next to a Christmas tree, and a 
reasonable adherent of the Christian or Jewish faiths would not view 
                                                          
 108. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (analogizing between the 
display and a museum exhibit by stating that “a typical museum setting, though not 
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of 
endorsement of that content”). 
 109. Id. at 697 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 110. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 111. Id. at 595 (plurality opinion). 
 112. Id. at 578. 
 113. Id. at 580 & n.5. 
 114. Id. at 582, 587. 
 115. Id. at 598 (majority opinion). 
 116. Id. at 600. 
 117. Id. 
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the display as an endorsement of either religion.118  Instead, this 
display would likely be seen as a recognition of the winter-holiday 
season.119  In her concurring opinion in Allegheny, Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that an essential principle of the Establishment Clause is 
that it, “at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to 
take a position on questions of religious belief or from ‘making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in 
the political community.’”120 
Similarly, the Court invalidated a school policy that, among other 
things, permitted student-led and initiated prayer at school football 
games in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.121  The Court 
utilized the endorsement test—as well as the Lemon and the coercion 
tests—to determine that the policy violated the Establishment 
Clause.122  In its endorsement analysis, the Court rejected the Santa 
Fe School District’s claim that the school was not involved and that 
the students, not the schools, chose to have, and actually delivered, 
the prayer.123  Instead, the Court found that the policy resulted in 
both perceived and actual endorsement of religion because the 
prayer was delivered on school grounds, at a school activity, and with 
school resources.124  The pregame prayer was found to “bear the 
imprint of the State,”125 and the Court asserted that based on the 
context in which the prayer was delivered, “an objective Santa Fe 
High School student [would] unquestionably perceive the inevitable 
pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.”126  
Based on the criteria set forth in the concurrence in Lynch,127 the 
Court held that such a policy was an impermissible endorsement 
because it sent the message to those members of the audience who 
were adherents of a particular religion that they were insiders and 
favored members of the school community, while sending the 
                                                          
 118. Id. at 617–20 (plurality opinion). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 593−94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 121. 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000). 
 122. See id. at 305, 314, 316–17. 
 123. Id. at 305. 
 124. Id. at 307−08. 
 125. Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Id. at 308. 
 127. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(articulating that an essential part of the endorsement analysis is whether a 
reasonable adherent would feel as though he was an insider or a favored member of 
the political community, or whether a reasonable nonadherent would feel as though 
he were an outsider or a disfavored member of the political community). 
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accompanying message to nonadherents that they were outsiders and 
were not full members of the school community.128 
3. The coercion test 
The final Establishment Clause test that the Supreme Court has 
used is known as the “coercion test.”  The coercion test was first 
crafted in Lee v. Weisman.129  Daniel Weisman, on behalf of himself 
and his daughter Deborah, brought an Establishment Clause claim 
against the principal of Nathan Bishop Middle School in Providence, 
Rhode Island.130  He alleged that the school’s policy of allowing 
principals to invite members of the clergy to deliver prayers as part of 
graduation ceremonies violated his daughter’s First Amendment 
rights.131  In analyzing whether prayer during school graduation 
ceremonies was consistent with the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court declared that the Lemon test was not 
the appropriate analysis for the situation at hand.132  Instead, the 
pervasive degree of government involvement with religious activity 
was sufficient in and of itself to determine the constitutionality of 
allowing a nonsectarian prayer at a school graduation.133  The Court 
focused its reasoning on the concept of coercion, holding that the 
Establishment Clause precludes the government from coercing 
citizens into giving up their constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
benefits in order to resist conformance to government-sponsored 
religious practice.134  The coercion test stems from the undisputed 
belief that “the Constitution guarantees that government may not 
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or 
otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious 
faith, or tends to do so.’”135 
The legal test is whether the government action coerces a religious 
belief or practice by putting pressure on or forcing an individual who 
does not subscribe to a particular religion to follow or partake in the 
                                                          
 128. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309–10. 
 129. 505 U.S. 577, 595–96 (1992). 
 130. Id. at 581. 
 131. Id. at 580–81. 
 132. See id. at 586−87, 599 (circumventing the “invitation” to reconsider Lemon and 
instead finding that “[n]o holding of this Court suggests that a school can persuade 
or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise”). 
 133. Id. at 587. 
 134. Id. at 587, 596.  For example, in Lee, the Court found that the school was 
violating many students’ right to freedom of religion by forcing them to acknowledge 
the religious prayer being voiced at the graduation ceremony, and therefore 
compelling them to forego their constitutional right.  See id. at 596. 
 135. Id. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
678 (1984)). 
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observation of that religion.136  While coercion may be direct137 or 
indirect,138 direct coercion is not required to violate the 
Establishment Clause.139  Unconstitutional coercion may instead take 
the form of “subtle coercive pressure” that obstructs a person’s true 
choice about whether to participate in the religious activity at issue.140  
Courts have also found that certain government action can 
functionally coerce participation if individuals are forced to at least 
acknowledge the religious activity.141 
The Supreme Court in Lee found that including clergy members 
who offer prayers as part of an official public school convocation 
ceremony was unconstitutional government coercion.142  The Court 
reasoned that although the school did not mandate attendance at 
graduation or require students to stand during the prayer, there was 
significant coercive pressure to attend and to stand and respect the 
prayer at the ceremonies.143  Students who did not desire to 
participate in the prayer were still required to be silent, and the 
Court found that this silence amounted to functional coercion 
because it could be perceived as functionally identical to partaking in 
the prayer.144 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expanded the 
coercion analysis in Kerr v. Farrey.145  There, an inmate brought a case 
against the state prison alleging that the prison’s threat of penalties 
compelled him to attend religious-themed Narcotics Anonymous 
meetings with no alternative secular program.146  In determining 
                                                          
 136. See id. at 593–95 (holding that the school district’s control of the graduation 
ceremony puts pressure on attendees to participate in prayer); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 
472, 477 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the types of cases in which courts have applied 
the coercion test). 
 137. See, e.g., Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479−80 (insisting that an inmate was forced to 
participate in the religious-based meetings because he was significantly penalized for 
refusing to attend and was given no other option). 
 138. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (maintaining that although the students were not 
forced to participate in the prayer, they were obliged to recognize that the prayer was 
being given and to be silent during it). 
 139. See id. at 592 (specifically mentioning the issue of indirect coercion rather 
than direct coercion). 
 140. Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 
2010); see Lee, 505 U.S. at 588, 593 (finding that there was coercive pressure for 
students to attend the graduation ceremony and to stand and respect the prayer and 
contending that this pressure “can be as real as any overt compulsion”). 
 141. See, e.g., Hanover, 626 F.3d at 12−14 (contrasting a student’s silence during 
group prayer in Lee as perceived participation in religious activity with the less overt 
silence of a student choosing not to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 142. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 597. 
 143. Id. at 593−98. 
 144. Id. at 593. 
 145. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 146. Id. at 473–74. 
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whether the government action requiring the inmate to attend the 
religious-based narcotics meeting was unconstitutional, the Seventh 
Circuit laid out three factors for examining a potentially coercive 
religious practice:  (1) was there government action, (2) did the 
government action amount to coercion, and (3) was the object of the 
coercion in question religious or secular in nature?147  Focusing on 
these three factors, the Seventh Circuit deduced that requiring the 
inmate to attend the religious-based narcotics meetings was 
coercion, that the coercion was religious in nature, and that the 
coercion resulted in the state favoring religion over nonreligion.148  
The court determined that the government action coerced the 
inmate to observe religion in violation of the Establishment Clause 
because the inmate had no option but to participate in the 
religious-sponsored practice.149 
The coercion test rounds out the three main tests that courts use in 
order to analyze whether government action has violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Courts have utilized 
these three tests to assess a variety of government actions people 
believe are unconstitutional.150  
B. President Bush’s Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 
In 2001, President George W. Bush, by executive order and without 
legislative authorization or support, created the White House Office 
of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.151  The FBCI is a federal 
program that ensures faith-based community groups and 
organizations are as equally eligible as secular groups to compete for 
federal funding to provide social services to the public.152  President 
                                                          
 147. Id. at 479. 
 148. Id. at 479−80. 
 149. Id. (dismissing as insufficient the State’s claim that the Narcotics Anonymous 
program’s religious aspects could include the nonreligious idea of will power). 
 150. See Lance E. Shurtleff, Case Note, Confusing Game Plan:  The Court Has To Use 
Every Play in the Book To Keep Prayer Out of High School Football—Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000), 1 WYO. L. REV. 723, 730–34 (2001) 
(explaining the evolution and application of the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion 
tests).  See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 599–600 (1989) (demonstrating how the placement of a crèche on the stairs of 
the county building functions as an endorsement of Christianity by county officials) 
 151. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001), reprinted in 3 
U.S.C. § 21 app. at 13–14 (2012) (establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives and directing it to lead the Administration’s effort to 
expand the role of faith-based and other private community organizations in 
delivering social services to the public and to strengthen their ability to meet the 
needs of communities); see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 
587, 593−94 (2007) (plurality opinion) (clarifying how religious groups may compete 
for federal financial support without weakening their independence). 
 152. Hein, 551 U.S. at 593–94. 
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Bush also issued separate executive orders to establish FBCI 
Executive Department Centers in various federal agencies and 
departments.153  All of these centers are funded through Executive 
Branch appropriations, meaning that Congress has not acted to fund 
these entities’ activities.154 
1. The rules and regulations 
Under the FBCI, religious organizations have the same opportunity 
to apply for federal funding as secular organizations and community 
groups, so long as they seek to “achieve valid public purposes,” and 
follow the “bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination, 
evenhandedness, and neutrality.”155  To adhere to these 
requirements, religious organizations or institutions seeking to apply 
for grants or federal funding pursuant to the FBCI must adhere to 
specified rules and regulations.156 
Religious organizations are not to use any direct federal financial 
assistance to support “inherently religious activities,” including 
worship, religious instruction, or proselytization.157  Federal funds 
may only be used for social services, and any organization wishing to 
engage in inherently religious activities in connection with delivering 
social services must segregate the religious activities from the social 
services and pay for them with private funds only.158  While federal 
funds may not be used to fund religious activities, individuals 
receiving services from faith-based organizations may choose to 
participate in the organization’s religious activities, but organizations 
are barred from requiring such participation.159  Religious 
organizations should reassure program participants that the 
organizations can still receive aid even if a participant does not join 
                                                          
 153. Id. at 594 & n.1 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 29, 
2001), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 96; Exec. Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg. 
77,145 (Dec. 12, 2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 99–100; Exec. Order No. 
13,342, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,509 (June 1, 2004), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 99–100; 
Exec. Order No. 13,397, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,275 (Mar. 7, 2006), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 app. at 101–02) (explaining that the President charged these centers with 
ensuring that faith-based community groups would maintain eligibility to compete 
for federal financial support without jeopardizing their independence or autonomy). 
 154. Id. at 595.  
 155. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499. 
 156. See Partnering with the Federal Government:  Some Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based 
Organizations, WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 
/government/fbci/guidance/partnering.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) 
[hereinafter Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations] (outlining the rules faith-
based organizations must follow in order to properly act under the FBCI). 
 157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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in religious conduct and that participation, or lack thereof, will have 
no effect on the services received.160  Finally, if an organization 
receives federal money, it cannot choose to provide services to some 
people while denying it to individuals who are otherwise eligible to 
receive the service.161  Officials designating the subcontracts must 
offer a secular alternative when a beneficiary does not wish to be 
served by a faith-based provider.162  An organization that takes federal 
funds and violates any of the specified requirements may be subject 
to legal action.163 
2. The Court’s refusal to analyze the FBCI 
Although many scholars and lower courts have questioned the 
constitutionality of the FBCI,164 the Supreme Court has yet to take a 
stance on the issue.  In 2007, the Court had an opportunity to rule on 
whether the use of federal money to fund the FBCI violated the 
Establishment Clause in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 
Inc.165  The Freedom from Religion Foundation brought suit, alleging 
that the directors of the White House Office and various executive 
department centers violated the Establishment Clause by promoting 
religious organizations as more worthy of federal financing than 
secular organizations during conferences held as part of the FBCI 
program.166  However, the Court refused to rule on the merits of the 
case.167  Because the defendants were acting on behalf of the 
President, not Congress, the Court found that the plaintiffs were not 
challenging any congressional action and thus, that they lacked 
taxpayer standing to bring suit in federal court.168 
                                                          
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Faith-Based Initiative 2.0:  The Bush Faith-Based and 
Community Initiative, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 936 (2009). 
 163. Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations, supra note 156 (providing that 
potential punishment includes loss of grant funds, repayment of the funds received, 
payment of any damages awarded by court action, and even criminal prosecution).  
 164. See generally Kyle Forsyth, Neutrality and the Establishment Clause:  The 
Constitutional Status of “Faith-Based and Community Initiatives” After Agostini and 
Mitchell, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 593 (2003) (discussing the 
constitutionality of the FBCI in lieu of Supreme Court precedent); Ira C. Lupu & 
Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 
(2005) (detailing what the FBCI are, and determining that the FBCI will push the 
limits of the Constitution). 
 165. 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion).  
 166. Id. at 592, 594–95. 
 167. See id. at 593 (ruling on the issue of standing). 
 168. Id. at 593, 605 (refusing to adopt a broad reading of an otherwise narrow 
exception to the general bar on taxpayer standing to accommodate the plaintiffs’ 
claim).  The plaintiffs attempted to establish standing by asserting that members of 
the organization were federal taxpayers and that the Executive Branch’s use of 
taxpayer dollars to fund the conferences violated their rights under the 
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3. The FBCI in effect today 
In February 2009, President Barack Obama formed the White 
House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships in an 
effort to continue and expand upon President Bush’s initiatives.169  
This expansion reflects the notion that religious organizations that 
have received aid provide many social services to the public across the 
country.170  Some of these services include HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment programs, prisoner re-entry programs, drug treatment 
programs, food banks, and expanding affordable housing.171 
Until the Supreme Court addresses the constitutionality of the 
FBCI and similar programs, the practice of allowing religious groups 
and organizations to subcontract for federal funds and provide social 
services to the public is likely to continue as an accepted practice as 
long as certain rules and procedures are followed.172  This Comment 
does not address the constitutionality of the FBCI, but simply 
acknowledges the fact that the practice of allowing faith-based 
organizations to use federal aid to provide valid public services is 
currently allowed but is also potentially constitutionally problematic. 
                                                          
Establishment Clause.  Id. at 592–93.  In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court 
noted that paying taxes has long been held insufficient to establish standing.  Id. at 
593.  Furthermore, a narrow exception to this general rule did not apply because 
Congress did not specifically authorize funding for the conferences; rather, the 
conferences were paid for through general appropriations to the Executive 
Branch.  Id. 
 169. Obama Announces White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, 
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Obama 
AnnouncesWhiteHouseOfficeofFaith-basedandNeighborhoodPartnerships (announcing 
the creation of the new office and listing its key priorities, which include integrating 
community groups into the nation’s economic recovery efforts, addressing issues 
affecting women and children, supporting fathers and encouraging responsible 
fatherhood, and working with the National Security Council to “foster interfaith 
dialogue” worldwide); see also Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 932 (explaining how 
Barack Obama, as a presidential candidate, announced that he would “expand and 
improve” on President Bush’s FBCI program as President—a promise he later kept 
by establishing the new office). 
 170. See Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 935, 937–38 (describing some of the key 
roles faith-based organizations play in providing social services and noting that the 
nation’s congregations make up “a major part of our social safety net”). 
 171. Id. at 937–38; see also John J. Dilulio Jr., Amen (Again) to Faith-Based Initiatives, 
WASH. POST, (Jan. 28, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/guest-
voices/post/amen-again-to-faith-based-initiatives/2013/01/28/acfb709a-66b6-11e2-
85f5-a8a9228e55e7_blog.html (illustrating the importance of faith-based groups in 
providing necessary services across the country). 
 172. See supra Part I.B.2 (referring to the Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on 
whether federal funding of the FBCI violates the Establishment Clause); see also supra 
Part I.B.1 (describing the establishment of the FBCI and the regulations governing 
faith-based organizations that accept federal funding). 
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C. Taking the FBCI a Step Further:  ACLU of Massachusetts v. Sebelius 
1. The underlying statute:  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
In response to the major issue of human trafficking in the United 
States and worldwide, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000173 (TVPA or “the Act”).174  The three major 
goals of the TVPA were to prevent human trafficking, protect and 
provide support for trafficking victims as they rebuilt their lives, and 
prosecute traffickers with more severe penalties.175  Part of the 
protection aspect of the TVPA provides a wide range of benefits and 
services—including cash, medical assistance, and social aid—to 
trafficking victims under federal and state funded programs.176  These 
benefits and services are available to U.S. citizens to the same extent 
as refugees.177  Although not explicitly mentioned in the TVPA, 
refugees receive medical care in the form of contraceptive material 
and abortion services in certain situations178 through the Refugee Act 
of 1980.179  Trafficking victims often require similar services.180 
                                                          
 173. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 
7101−112 (2012); see also Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/trafficking/about/TVPA 
_2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter TVPA Fact Sheet] (outlining the 
history, purpose, and details of the TVPA). 
 174. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (documenting Congressional findings regarding the 
existence of slavery and human trafficking throughout the world); TVPA Fact Sheet, 
supra note 173 (naming trafficking as the “fastest growing source” of money for 
organized crime groups and enterprises across the world). 
 175. TVPA Fact Sheet, supra note 173.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 477 n.5 (D. Mass. 
2012) (citing to both the ACLU’s and the USCCB’s statement of facts, which 
explained that “Medicaid and Refugee Medical Assistance pay for contraception 
and abortions in the case of rape, incest, and when the woman’s life is in 
danger”), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 179. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521−1524.  The Refugee Act of 1980 created the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement to help refugees become economically self-sufficient as fast as 
possible after arriving in the United States.  Id. §§ 1521(a), 1522(a)(1)(A).  The 
Refugee Act placed the HHS in charge of allocating the appropriated funds to 
organizations that would provide medical, employment, and social services to 
refugees pursuant to the Act.  Id. §§ 1521(a), 1522(c). 
 180. See Carol Rose, First Circuit Court Should Defend Victims of Human Trafficking, AM. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/religion-belief-
human-rights/first-circuit-court-should-defend-victims-human-trafficking (explaining how 
many trafficked women and children have been subjected to regular incidents of 
forced sexual activity and may need a variety of medical services, including abortion 
and contraceptive services and HIV and STD testing). 
LASHLEY.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:48 PM 
2013] GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT 631 
2. The formation of the contract between the HHS and the USCCB 
Within the TVPA, Congress included a provision that put the HHS 
in charge of using federal funds appropriated by Congress to 
implement the victim services required under the Act.181  The HHS 
was responsible for issuing grants and contracts to organizations and 
institutions to provide medical services to victims of trafficking.182  For 
five years, the HHS subcontracted with organizations that provided 
the requisite services to the trafficked persons through competitively 
selected grants.183  However, inefficiency and a lack of effectiveness 
compelled the HHS to reexamine its approach.184  In 2005, the HHS 
published a request for proposals to find a general contractor to take 
over the HHS’s job of administering federal funds to the different 
organizations pursuant to the TVPA.185 
The USCCB was one of two applicants that responded to the 
HHS’s request for proposals.186  During the application process, the 
USCCB informed the HHS that if it were to win the contract it would 
not allow any potential subcontractors to use federal funds for any 
victim services that conflicted with the USCCB’s religious beliefs.187  
Specifically, the USCCB stated that no subcontractors would be 
permitted to provide or refer abortion services or contraceptive 
materials with the funds that the USCCB allocated under the 
TVPA.188  Despite this condition, in 2006, after what the HHS claimed 
was a neutral selection process,189 the Agency awarded the USCCB the 
master contract for managing the federal funds under the TVPA.190  
The HHS-USCCB master contract lasted for five years until its 
                                                          
 181. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B)). 
 182. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B) (directing the HHS to “expand benefits and 
services to victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons in the United States”).  
Congress appropriated $5 million for such uses in Fiscal Year 2001 and as much as 
$10 million for each subsequent year.  Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
 183. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 49; Rose, supra note 180. 
 184. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 49. 
 185. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 476−77 (noting that, due to the Catholic nature of the organization, the 
USCCB would “need to ensure that [its] victim services are not used to refer or fund 
activities that would be contrary to [its] moral convictions and religious beliefs” and 
would have to provide a disclaimer to potential subcontractors notifying them of this 
requirement). 
 188. Id. at 477. 
 189. Id. at 487–88 (asserting that while the selection process may have been 
neutral at the outset, the HHS’s decision to allow the USCCB to bar funds from 
being used for abortions and contraceptives “was neither customary nor neutral”). 
 190. Id. at 477. 
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expiration in 2011, and during that period the government awarding 
the USCCB $15.9 million.191 
3. The lawsuit 
The ACLU of Massachusetts brought suit against HHS officials on 
January 12, 2009, alleging that the HHS contract with the USCCB, 
which allowed the organization “to impose a religiously based 
restriction on the use of taxpayer funds” violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.192  On March 23, 2012, the 
Massachusetts District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the ACLU.193  The court applied both the endorsement and Lemon 
tests and found that delegating authority to a religious institution, 
which imposed restrictions on the use of taxpayer money based on 
religion, endorsed religion and failed the Lemon test.194  According to 
the court, the then-expired HHS-USCCB contract violated the First 
Amendment because it “impliedly endorsed the religious beliefs of 
the USCCB.”195 
The defendant-intervenor, USCCB, appealed the decision, and on 
January 15, 2013, the First Circuit in ACLU of Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops196 dismissed the case as moot because the 
contract between the HHS and the USCCB had expired.197  The court 
vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case with 
instructions to dismiss.198 
II. A MASTER CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND A 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION FAILS ALL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS AND 
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Circuit’s “decision leaves unanswered the legal question 
of religious accommodation in the delivery of services under a federal 
                                                          
 191. See id. at 478 & n.7 (stating that the original contract term lasted one year 
with options for four yearly renewals, all of which the HHS exercised). 
 192. Id. at 478. 
 193. Id. at 474, 488.  
 194. See id. at 483−88 (rejecting the USCCB’s argument that the government’s 
recognition of its restrictions was simply an accommodation of religious belief and 
holding that the restrictions were instead an endorsement because they “provide[d] 
a significant symbolic benefit to religion” and were not “truly voluntary” (quoting 
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1982))). 
 195. Id. at 488. 
 196. 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 197. Id. at 51, 58. 
 198. Id. at 48; see also Dennis Sadowski, Federal Court Panel Dismisses ACLU Challenge of 
USCCB Trafficking Grant, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://ncronline.org/news/ 
politics/federal-court-panel-dismisses-aclu-challenge-usccb-trafficking-grant (explaining 
the decision’s impact on the USCCB and the individuals it serves). 
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contract.”199  Once again, a court failed to address the 
constitutionality of allowing religious institutions to receive taxpayer 
funds to provide social services.200  Although the contract between the 
HHS and the USCCB has expired, there is no law in place to prohibit 
similar contracts from being created in the future.  In fact, the 
USCCB stated that it would continue to seek opportunities to 
collaborate with the government to provide these services.201  The 
director of media relations for the USCCB, Mary Ann Walsh, 
considered the First Circuit’s decision to vacate the district court’s 
decision a limited victory for faith-based organizations, and admitted 
that a ruling on the merits would have negatively affected future 
contracts between the government and faith-based organizations 
seeking to “exercis[e] their conscience rights.”202 
Master contracts such as the HHS-USCCB contract will occur again, 
and the real question, beyond standing and mootness, is whether the 
mere formation of such contracts violates the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.  The ACLU, in basing its constitutionality 
argument only on the fact that there was a religiously motivated 
prohibition on services missed an opportunity to have a court look at 
the larger issue of government agencies delegating their duties to 
religious institutions.203  As a result of the limited argument, the 
Massachusetts District Court granted summary judgment on narrow 
grounds, and declared the HHS-USCCB contract unconstitutional 
solely on the restriction the USCCB put in place.204  Rather than 
focusing on the specifics of the master contract, the ACLU should 
have focused more broadly.  Arguing that allowing a government 
agency to contract with a religious institution in order to allow that 
institution to implement provisions of a legislative act is 
unconstitutional would have brought attention to this larger issue.  
Had the ACLU argued that the government violated the First 
                                                          
 199. Sadowski, supra note 198.  Henry Dinger, the attorney who represented the 
USCCB, admitted that the decision “doesn’t resolve anything on the merits (of the 
ACLU’s claim).”  Id. 
 200. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision not to 
determine whether the FBCI violates the Establishment Clause). 
 201. ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated 
as moot sub nom., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44. 
 202. Sadowski, supra note 198. 
 203. See Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3–5 (arguing only that allowing the USCCB 
to dictate which services trafficking victims receive with federal funds violates the 
Establishment Clause). 
 204. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (holding that the HHS violated the 
Establishment Clause by granting authority to a faith-based organization, specifically 
the USCCB, to enforce a religiously motivated restriction on the expenditure of 
taxpayer dollars). 
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Amendment when it formed a contract with the USCCB to put the 
power of the HHS into the hands of the Catholic organization, the 
case might have turned out very differently.  If the court had looked 
at contracts generally, instead of the details of this one contract, the 
legal analysis might have resulted in an opinion that would have 
prevented future master contracts between the government and 
religious organizations.  Regardless of whether the religious 
institution in charge of the master contract invokes religious 
restrictions, the mere existence of a master contract between a 
government agency and a religious institution is, in itself, an 
Establishment Clause violation. 
The following section explains how a master contract is different 
from a subcontract that may be permitted under the FBCI.  It also 
suggests and illustrates a framework that courts should use when 
examining master contracts using the three Establishment Clause 
tests.  Finally, it applies this framework to analyze the expired 
HHS-USCCB contract as a whole rather than just analyzing the 
religious restriction. 
A. Master Contracts Are Not Comparable to the Subcontracts Permitted 
Under the FBCI Because They Delegate More Power and Are Not Restricted by 
Rules and Regulations 
President Bush created the FBCI to provide faith-based 
organizations with the same opportunities as secular organizations 
when applying for federal grants to provide social services.205  Even if 
the general public is prepared to accept the FBCI as constitutional—
or at least as a necessary means of providing important social 
services—the master contracts create relationships that are 
completely different from the subcontracted religious organizations 
acting under the FBCI.  Additionally, the master contracts break 
many of the rules set forth by the FBCI. 
To minimize the link between church and state and thus 
circumvent the constitutionality issue, the FBCI included many rules 
and regulations that control the subcontracts awarded to faith-based 
organizations.206  Alternatively, the general master contract between 
the HHS and the USCCB was wholly different from these 
                                                          
 205. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593−94 (2007) 
(plurality opinion). 
 206. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 936 (stating that 
grant officials may not be biased in favor of or against faith-based applicants, that 
applicants may not provide services on a religiously selective basis, and that 
“inherently religious activities” must remain distinct from services funded by federal 
monetary aid). 
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subcontracts, not only due to the amount of authority delegated to 
the religious organization, but also due to the fact that the master 
contract broke the rules and regulations that determine what is 
permitted under the FBCI. 
Rather than applying to be one of multiple service providers, the 
USCCB was awarded the master contract to be the body that selects 
service providers.207  Because the contract delegated this federal 
agency function to the USCCB, the process directly conflicted with 
the requirement that the federal agencies distributing subcontracts 
must ensure that beneficiaries have an option to interact with 
nonreligious service providers.208  The individuals seeking services 
and the organizations applying for federal funding have no 
alternative, such as working directly with a federal agency, to working 
with the religious institution in charge of the master contract.209  
Under the FBCI, the role of faith-based organizations is limited to 
providing social services, and beneficiaries cannot be selected based 
on religious preferences or beliefs.210  In contrast, the role of the 
USCCB in the master contract was not limited to providing social 
services; instead its role was vastly expanded to oversee all 
organizations that provided such services.211  Even more worrisome, 
the government has yet to implement any restrictions to prevent 
religious institutions with such power from selecting subcontract 
beneficiaries based on religion.212  Additionally, in order for a faith-
based organization to act properly under the FBCI, it must ensure 
that it separates religious activities from government-funded services 
offered and that it does not use taxpayer money to fund any religious 
                                                          
 207. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–77. 
 208. Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 936 (clarifying that, under the Charitable 
Choice provisions initially implemented by President Bill Clinton in 1996, faith-based 
organization officials must guarantee that beneficiaries have an option to interact 
with nonreligious service providers if they so choose). 
 209. See generally Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–77 (explaining how the HHS, the 
original entity with the authority to make grants to nonprofit organizations, handed 
off this responsibility to one private, faith-based organization:  the USCCB).  
 210. See Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations, supra note 156 (outlining 
the rules faith-based organizations must follow in order to properly act under 
the FBCI). 
 211. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (explaining that, pursuant to being 
awarded the master contract, the USCCB subcontracted with service providers). 
 212. See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 48 
(1st. Cir. 2013) (avoiding ruling on whether selecting subcontractors based on 
religious belief is permitted by finding that the contract at issue was moot).  In fact, 
under the HHS-USCCB contract, subcontractors were specifically selected only if 
they would agree not to provide services or refer patients for services that were 
against the beliefs of the Catholic religion.  Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78. 
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activities.213  With subcontracts, the government requires financial 
status reports, strict record-keeping, and audits to guarantee that 
the religious organization is separating its religion and religious 
activities from any services funded by the government.214  However, 
no such safeguards are found regarding master contracts.  
Furthermore, there was nothing to certify that the USCCB or a 
similarly situated religious institution would separate its religion 
from its use of government funds.215 
The master contracts grant more power and authority than the 
subcontracts,216 allow for discretion with government funds rather 
than strictly designating a particular use for the funds,217 do not 
have safeguards in place to prevent religious beliefs from 
influencing the organization’s policies,218 and fail to offer the 
secular alternative that is required under the FBCI.219  As such, the 
master contracts are entirely separate from any FBCI subcontracts 
granted to faith-based organizations. 
B. Master Contracts Fail All Three Establishment Clause Tests 
These master contracts are so different from the subcontracts 
permitted under the FBCI that a rigorous Establishment Clause 
                                                          
 213. See supra Part I.B.1 (delineating the requirements for acting correctly 
under the FBCI); see also Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations, supra note 
156 (same). 
 214. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED & CMTY. INITIATIVES, GUIDANCE TO FAITH-
BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ON PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6–
7, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fbnp/pdfs/GuidanceDocument.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2013) (listing the legal obligations that accompany a federal grant). 
 215. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 482, 485 (providing no mention of precautions 
taken to ensure that the USCCB separated its religion from its duties and describing 
how, in fact, the USCCB explicitly did not separate the two by invoking the religion-
based restriction). 
 216. See supra notes 210–211 and accompanying text (highlighting that while 
subcontractors simply provide social services to eligible beneficiaries, the master 
contractor oversees all of the subcontractors providing these services); see also supra 
note 207 and accompanying text (stating that the organization awarded the master 
contract is granted the expanded responsibility of selecting subcontractors). 
 217. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text (asserting that no measures 
exist to ensure that the USCCB or another master contractor would be required to 
use federal funding solely for nonreligious activities). 
 218. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that the government allows 
faith-based organizations awarded the master contract to impose religiously 
motivated restrictions on subcontractors’ use of federal funds); supra notes 214–215 
and accompanying text (describing how the safeguards put in place to ensure that 
faith-based subcontractors do not use government funds for religious activities do 
not apply to master contractors). 
 219. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text (concluding that, because a 
faith-based organization was awarded the master contract and given the sole 
authority to award subcontracts, organizations have no alternative but to use the 
federal funding they receive in a manner that adheres to religiously motivated rules).   
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analysis is required to determine whether they are constitutional.  As 
discussed in Part I, there are several Establishment Clause tests; any 
master contract formed between the government and a faith-based 
institution is likely unconstitutional regardless of the test applied. 
1. Applying the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test 
The district court’s opinion in Sebelius discussed the Lemon-Agostini-
Mitchell test but only in reference to the government’s delegation of 
authority to the USCCB to impose restrictions on the types of services 
available under the TVPA.220  When the government action at issue is 
the making of the master contract, however, additional lines of 
inquiry are relevant to a court’s analysis. 
In addressing the first question of the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test—
whether the government action has a secular purpose221—a master 
contract awarded to a religious organization likely satisfies this prong.  
Similar to the government actions in Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell, in 
which the government alleged that the actions had the secular 
purpose of providing educational services to students,222 the HHS-
USCCB contract had the secular and primary purpose of providing 
money to give services to trafficking victims pursuant to the TVPA.223  
Because these contracts all involved using money to implement 
provisions of legislative acts, they almost certainly contained a secular 
purpose to pass the first prong of the test.224 
The master contract becomes problematic when analyzed under 
the second prong—whether the primary effect of the government 
action either advances or hinders religion—and the three criteria 
                                                          
 220. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 486−87. 
 221. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (stating that the first prong 
did not change from the original Lemon test); see also supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
 222. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829–30 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(acknowledging that “[t]he program makes a broad array of schools eligible for aid 
without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof”); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 
234–35 (holding that a program providing supplemental remedial education, 
granted to recipients on a neutral basis, does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause where the instruction is distributed by public employees on the campus of 
sectarian schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (invalidating 
programs in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania providing direct aid to parochial schools 
for supposedly nonreligious educational purposes). 
 223. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (explaining that the HHS sought to 
find a general contractor to administer the funds to organizations working with 
trafficking victims). 
 224. It would be difficult for these contracts to fail this prong, as the government 
is not required to promulgate programs based solely upon a secular purpose, and 
even an action partly motivated by a religious purpose may still satisfy this prong.  See 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (acknowledging that a law may be 
invalidated only if it seeks to advance religion without any secular purpose). 
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that are used in this inquiry.225  A key aspect of whether the contract 
results in government indoctrination226 is whether the formation of 
the contract gives rise to the distribution of federal aid based on 
religious beliefs or whether it is offered to a variety of groups without 
regard to religion.227  Clearly the HHS-USCCB contract resulted in 
allocation of federal aid to subcontractors based on whether the 
services offered were against certain religious beliefs.228  However, 
this result may not have been as evident without USCCB’s 
articulated restriction.  While it may be possible for a religious 
organization to select subcontractors in a neutral manner, some 
may find it challenging to ignore core beliefs and ideals229—or to 
ignore the beliefs of potential subcontractors—when deciding 
whether to award aid.230 
The question of neutrality also arises when looking at whether an 
aid recipient—the subcontractors in this case—is defined with 
respect to religion,231 and specifically whether there exists a financial 
incentive for aid recipients to choose religion over a secular 
alternative.232  Put another way, the inquiry must be whether the 
HHS-USCCB contract gave federal fund recipients any incentive to 
                                                          
 225. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612−13 (creating the famous three-pronged Lemon test 
which, in part, provides that a law’s “principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion”); see also supra text accompanying notes 60, 
71, 85 (defining the three criteria of the second prong as (1) whether the 
government action resulted in government indoctrination, (2) whether the 
government action defines aid recipients with respect to religion, and (3) whether it 
creates excessive government entanglement). 
 226. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (asserting that all three criteria must be 
examined in scope and that “the last two considerations are insufficient by 
themselves” to determine whether the government action results in 
government indoctrination). 
 227. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 (plurality opinion) (asserting that, if a program 
offers to aid both religious and nonreligious recipients, it is unclear what type of 
constitutional violation a program would engender without more specified analysis 
into the secular or religious purposes of the governing law). 
 228. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–77 (discussing the USCCB’s position that 
it cannot be associated with entities that perform abortions or offer 
contraceptives to clients). 
 229. See generally Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125−26 (1982) 
(recognizing that a faith-based organization may abuse its power to benefit 
religion but that, even assuming that a faith-based group may act in good faith in 
exercising power governed to it by statute, “the mere appearance of a joint 
exercise of legislative authority by Church and State” may instill in some people 
the notion that the faith-based group may use its power to benefit religion and 
those that practice it). 
 230. See generally USCCB Mission, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb 
.org/about/usccb-mission.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (explaining that “[t]he 
Gospel of Christ and the teachings of his Church guide the work of the USCCB”). 
 231. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (providing this as the second criterion to take 
into account in establishing the primary effect of the action). 
 232. See id. at 231 (including these incentives for choosing religion as an aspect of 
the second criterion). 
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modify their religious beliefs in order to be selected as a 
subcontractor.233  Unlike in Agostini and Mitchell, where the Supreme 
Court found that no financial incentive existed because aid was 
awarded to eligible students regardless of their religious beliefs,234 the 
USCCB selected which organizations were to receive aid based on 
whether the organizations would tailor their spending to comply with 
the USCCB’s religious beliefs.235  The USCCB allocation was not 
comparable to a program that provides aid to all disadvantaged 
students or schools that meet the requirements; with the master 
contract at issue, organizations that were otherwise eligible may have 
been denied a subcontract at the USCCB’s discretion.  The USCCB’s 
restrictions on abortion and contraceptive services made accepting 
the group’s religious practices a prerequisite to receiving funds.236  
Even without the restrictions in place, organizations that knew they 
were applying to the USCCB may have felt as though there was a 
better chance of being awarded a subcontract from the Catholic 
organization if they adopted or accepted such religious beliefs.237 
Additionally, the inquiry into whether aid recipients are 
determined with respect to religion should include an assessment of 
whether individuals seeking service providers have a choice between a 
                                                          
 233. See id. at 232 (holding that the New York City Title I program at issue did not 
give aid recipients any incentive to change their religious practices or beliefs in order 
to obtain such aid). 
 234. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829–30 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(acknowledging aid distribution according to enrollment size without any 
consideration of religious affiliation); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (finding that all 
children who met the Act’s eligibility requirements were awarded services, no matter 
what religious beliefs they possessed). 
 235. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476−78 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(providing the backstory on how HHS awarded the general contract to the USCCB 
and further explaining that the USCCB provided over 100 grants to different 
institutions, many of which were not Catholic institutions, for the purposes of 
assisting victims of trafficking), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 236. See id. at 477 (describing how the USCCB entered into subcontracts with over 
100 organizations providing services and that the subcontractors were required to 
agree to adhere to the abortion/contraception restriction). 
 237. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s assertion in 
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc. that the appearance of a “joint exercise” of power by 
church and state may lead some to conclude that the faith-based group will use its 
power to advance religious views).  To satisfy restrictions against incentivizing 
religious practices, aid must be allocated based on criteria that do not factor religion, 
and must make funds available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a 
completely nondiscriminatory basis.  See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (distinguishing 
acceptable criteria in governmental aid distribution schemes); e.g., Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653−54 (2002) (holding that no financial incentives 
existed because a program offering educational scholarships to parents were 
awarded with no reference to religion and no benefit to using the scholarship for a 
religious school over a secular school). 
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wide range of religious organizations and secular organizations.238  A 
master contract with a religious organization removes alternatives for 
organizations seeking to subcontract and for individuals seeking 
services.  Neither party has any alternative but to interact with the 
religious institution charged with distributing the federal funds.239  
This lack of alternatives contradicts the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
in Mitchell that government aid to religious institutions is permitted 
only when it is the result of the beneficiary’s genuine, independent 
choice to receive the aid from a secular or religious provider.240  
Independent choice, after a master contract is awarded to a religious 
organization, hinges entirely upon whether the religious organization 
provides funds neutrally to religious and nonreligious institutions.241  
If genuinely independent choices are not available for 
organizations and individuals, the master contract fails the second 
criterion of the indoctrination question, and in turn fails the 
Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test.242 
The contract between HHS and USCCB also fails to meet the third 
criterion of the second prong in the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test—
whether the formation of the master contract results in excessive 
entanglements between the government and religion.243  Specifically, 
the contract between the HHS and the USCCB resulted in a direct 
                                                          
 238. See Agostini, 521 at 225–26 (emphasizing that federal aid was given to the 
religious schools solely as a result of the genuinely independent choice of those 
students deciding between religious and secular schools); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 
809 (plurality opinion) (articulating that the Supreme Court has, on multiple 
occasions, considered whether government aid to religious institutions was the result 
of an individual’s genuinely independent and private choice); Lin et al., supra note 
10, at 202–03 (discussing the Mitchell Court’s interpretation of the Agostini 
modifications to the Lemon test, and explaining that if aid is distributed to religious 
schools based on the private choice of individuals, then that aid is neutral). 
 239. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 49 (stating that the HHS 
sought a general contractor responsible for selecting grant recipients to offer services 
to trafficking victims). 
 240. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion) (asserting that any 
government aid provided to religious schools pursuant to the genuine independent 
choice of parents is permissible). 
 241. See id. at 810−11 (explaining the relationship between the principles of 
neutrality and private choice and that the possibility of genuinely independent 
choice is a way of assuring neutrality). 
 242. See id. at 810 (finding that “if numerous private choices, rather than the 
single choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant to neutral 
eligibility criteria, then a government cannot . . . grant special favors that might lead 
to a religious establishment”); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 487 (1986) (holding that the program in question satisfied this prong because 
“[a]ny aid provided . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a 
result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients”). 
 243. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234 (providing the third criterion, that laws 
creating an excessive entanglement between government and religion are 
violative of the Constitution). 
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entanglement by placing discretionary governmental power to 
control federal funds into the hands of a Catholic organization.244  
The master contract fails this prong of the test due to excessive 
entanglement for the same reasons as the state programs in Lemon.245  
The Court’s opinion in Lemon recognized the perpetual government 
supervision required to safeguard citizens from constitutional 
violations of excessive entanglement between state governments and 
religion.246  Similarly, to ensure that religious beliefs were not taken 
into account when the USCCB awarded subcontracts, the 
government would have needed to constantly monitor the selection 
process.  Unlike in Agostini where the monitoring efforts were 
considered minimal,247 the requisite efforts to oversee the distribution 
of subcontracts would result in a level of entanglement that the 
Supreme Court has previously deemed “excessive.”248  Requiring 
continuing government surveillance to guarantee that the USCCB—
or another religious institution—did not favor religious organizations 
for subcontracts, or did not impose religious restrictions, results in 
unconstitutional entanglement.249 
                                                          
 244. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 487 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(asserting that the HHS gave USCCB discretionary authority), vacated as moot sub 
nom., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44; see also Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126−27 (1982) (concluding in the Court’s entanglement 
evaluation that discretionary governmental powers were not meant to be delegated 
to—or shared with—religious institutions).  
 245. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) (acknowledging that a Rhode 
Island program required extensive state auditing to ensure funds went to primarily 
secular activities and that the measure was “fraught with the sort of entanglement 
that the Constitution forbids”); see also id. at 620–21 (holding that a Pennsylvania 
program also at issue required “the very [same] restrictions and surveillance 
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role giv[ing] rise to 
entanglements between church and state”). 
 246. See id. at 614, 622–23 (concluding that the programs excessively entangle the 
government in religion, and recounting the intentions of the Framers to prevent 
future political divisiveness caused by such excessive entanglement). 
 247. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35 (holding that program supervisors’ 
unannounced monthly audits to ensure that government-sponsored remedial 
supplemental education provided by state employees embedded at parochial schools 
was “[]sufficient to prevent or detect inculcation of religion by public employees”). 
 248. See id. at 233 (mentioning that whether pervasive monitoring by the public 
authorities is required as one of the grounds excessive entanglement rests on); 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616–17 (1988) (holding that while government 
monitoring may result in excessive entanglement in certain situations, the disputed 
and minimal review of grant applications, coupled with government employee site 
visits, did not amount to excessive entanglement). 
 249. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616 (discussing how the Rhode Island program at 
issue involved excessive entanglement between the state and religion because the 
state must provide surveillance to ensure that the statutory restrictions were being 
obeyed in implementing the program); see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 615 (mentioning 
the “Catch-22” issue that “the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not 
further religion renders the [government action] invalid” because it leads to 
excessive entanglement, and finding that although some supervision of the 
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The HHS-USCCB contract had a secular component and would 
thus prevail on an inquiry under the first prong of the Lemon-Agostini-
Mitchell test.250  However, there is potential for government 
indoctrination from the likely appearance of financial incentives to 
modify religious practices, an absence of any choice for 
subcontractors to interact with a different religious or secular 
institution, a potential lack of a genuine private choice, and excessive 
entanglement from constant monitoring.  For these reasons, the 
HHS-USCCB master contract had the primary effect of advancing 
religion and would fail the second prong of the test.251  Failing the 
prong, and therefore the test, leads to the conclusion that the 
creation of the master contract was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause, and was accordingly unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment. 
2. Applying the endorsement test 
As discussed in Part I, the endorsement test looks at what the 
public would fairly understand to be the purpose of the government 
action.252  This inquiry includes an assessment of how a reasonable 
adherent or nonadherent to the religion involved would look at the 
government action.253 
The Massachusetts District Court looked briefly at the endorsement 
test in its analysis of the HHS-USCCB contract and determined that 
the government impliedly endorsed the religious beliefs of the 
USCCB in allowing the “religious organization to impose religiously 
based restrictions on the expenditure of taxpayer funds.”254  The 
district court applied the endorsement test narrowly, looking solely 
at the restriction on reproductive services, to determine that 
                                                          
government action was required, it was less intensive monitoring and therefore did 
not amount to the level necessary to find the entanglement excessive). 
 250. The reasoning behind the creation of the master contract was to select a 
general contractor for administering funds under the TVPA.  ACLU of Mass. v. 
Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of 
Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 251. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982) (holding that a 
statute providing churches with the authority to unilaterally block liquor license 
applications enmeshed religion in the exercise of substantial governmental powers—
resulting in excessive entanglement that violates the Establishment Clause); Sebelius, 
821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–78 (summarizing the HHS’s decision to award the contract to 
USCCB despite the group’s requirement that subcontractors not provide abortion or 
contraceptive services to clients). 
 252. See supra Part I.A.2 and accompanying text. 
 253. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(noting that excessive entanglement may have an effect of creating political divisions 
between religious followers and nonadherents). 
 254. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 488. 
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permitting the USCCB to enact such a restriction would cause an 
objective observer to believe that the government was endorsing 
Catholic beliefs.255 
In fact, if the endorsement test were applied to the master contract 
generally, rather than just to the restriction, the government action 
of forming the master contract would similarly fail the test.  By 
placing the discretionary powers of a federal agency into the hands of 
the USCCB, the federal government—via the HHS—gave its 
authority to the Catholic Church.256  Similar to the Supreme Court’s 
determination regarding the nativity scene in County of Allegheny, the 
government, in forming this contract, sent an “unmistakable message 
that it supports and promotes” the Catholic religion and that it 
endorses the religious message of the USCCB.257  Unlike in Lynch, 
where the government action of putting up the nativity scene was not 
found to endorse religion because it was combined with several 
purely secular symbols, the government action in forming the master 
contract vested high authority in one religious institution while 
failing to grant any secular organization with comparable authority.258 
The HHS-USCCB contract created a problem similar to that found 
in the policy allowing student prayer at school football games in Santa 
Fe.259  The contract is analogous to the school district policy in that 
the public would perceive the religious message of the USCCB, like 
the prayer in Santa Fe, to bear the seal of approval of the government, 
regardless of the government’s efforts to distance itself from the 
religious nature of the USCCB.260  The appearance that the 
government sponsored the religious beliefs of the USCCB sent a 
secondary message, similar to that in Santa Fe.261  The message 
was that Catholics were insiders and favored members of the 
                                                          
 255. See id. at 485 (rejecting arguments that the government made an 
accommodation to the USCCB when it awarded the general contractor bid to the 
religious conference and instead narrowly focused on the religious motivations 
behind the USCCB’s restrictions). 
 256. See generally id. at 476 (quoting the USCCB as stating that it is a “Catholic 
organization” (emphasis added)); USCCB Mission, supra note 230 (maintaining that 
the USCCB is a Catholic organization guided by the word of Christ). 
 257. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
600 (1989) (declaring that the nativity display on its own can be construed as the 
government’s endorsement of Christian beliefs). 
 258. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
combination of secular and religious symbols in the display as the reasoning for 
concluding that the display was not an endorsement of religion). 
 259. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
 260. See id. at 308 (conveying the notion that members of the audience at the 
football games will view any religious prayer as being approved by the school even 
though the students chose to deliver a prayer and made all requisite efforts to do so). 
 261. Id. at 309. 
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political community, especially for selection as subcontractors, 
while non-Catholics were outsiders and disfavored members of 
the political community.262 
The master contract sent the message that the government 
promoted the Catholic beliefs of the USCCB, and in turn failed the 
primary question of the endorsement test:  whether a reasonable 
adherent would identify the government action as supporting his 
religion.  Therefore, the contract between the HHS and the USCCB 
fails the endorsement test and violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
3. Applying the coercion analysis 
The final Establishment Clause analysis to consider is whether the 
formation and existence of the master contract between the HHS and 
the USCCB resulted in unconstitutional, coercive pressure.  If such 
coercion existed and interfered with a person’s or organization’s 
choice about whether to participate in a religious activity or religious 
belief, or required that person or organization to give up rights in 
order to avoid participation, then the government action was 
unconstitutionally coercive.263 
To determine whether the HHS-USCCB master contract coerced 
religious beliefs or practices it is relevant to look at the three crucial 
points that the Seventh Circuit articulated in Kerr v. Farrey.264  First, 
the HHS clearly engaged in government action265 by seeking out 
general contractors, and, through a selection process, entering into a 
contract with the USCCB.266  The next question is whether the action 
of forming the contract resulted in coercion.267  In Kerr, the Seventh 
Circuit grappled with an inmate’s need for narcotics rehabilitation 
through group counseling and the religious affiliations of the only 
                                                          
 262. See id. (asserting that school sponsorship of a religious message sends the 
ancillary message to members of the audience who are adherents that they are 
insiders, and the accompanying message to nonadherents that they are outsiders). 
 263. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593−96 (1992) (applying the coercion test 
to conclude that a student may exercise the option to abstain from participation in a 
graduation ceremony containing a religious invocation and group prayer, and that 
such abstention is predicated upon a desire to avoid the schools impermissible and 
indirectly coercive effect of exacting religious conformity amongst students).  
 264. Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 265. See generally id. (describing the three main points in the coercion analysis). 
 266. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476−78 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(describing the process of forming the contract), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of 
Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 267. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479 (listing the three crucial points in the coercion analysis, 
the second of which prescribes an inquiry into whether the actions of the 
government amount to coercion). 
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program available to provide such counseling.268  Regarding the 
HHS-USCCB master contract, organizations risked forgoing federal 
aid to assist in providing social services to trafficked victims if they did 
not apply for subcontracts to obtain money under the TVPA, and 
their only path for doing so was through a religious institution.269  
Therefore, the pressure to do a certain activity—apply for a 
subcontract—and the consequences of not doing the activity—
foregoing federal funding—as well as the fact that the only means to 
do such an activity was to go through a religious institution, resulted 
in coercion.270  Finally, the remaining question is whether the 
coercion was religious in nature.271  The clearly religious nature of 
the twelve-step Narcotics Anonymous program, which was “based on 
the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being,” was 
sufficient for the court in Kerr to find that the coercion was 
religious.272  Similarly, the religious nature of the USCCB, as a 
Catholic organization whose mission is to do work guided by “[t]he 
Gospel of Christ and the teachings of his Church,”273 is enough to 
lead to the same conclusion—the coercion was religious. 
Rather than being directly coercive, the master contract may have 
entailed “subtle coercive pressure,”274 or may even have been 
functionally coercive.275  The existence of the HHS-USCCB contract 
required every potential subcontractor, as well as every trafficked 
victim seeking services promised by the TVPA, to interact with a 
Catholic institution.  The Court in Lee utilized a three-part syllogistic 
analysis to conclude that silence during convocation prayers 
functionally coerced students into religious expression.276  That 
silence was the equivalent of participating in the prayer, and the 
Court concluded that the students were being functionally coerced 
                                                          
 268. See id. (restating the inmate’s allegations that prison authorities were 
coercing him into religious activities because the prison only offered him a 
religiously based Narcotics Anonymous program). 
 269. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 477−78 (reviewing the USCCB’s power to select 
subcontractors).  
 270. Cf. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479−80 (holding that the pressure put on the inmate to 
attend narcotics rehabilitation at risk of serious consequences, and the lack of a 
secular option for him to adhere to such pressure, gave rise to coercion). 
 271. Id. at 479. 
 272. Id. at 480. 
 273. USCCB Mission, supra note 230. 
 274. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 12 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)) (making the 
distinction between direct coercion, and subtle coercive pressure that interferes with 
the “real choice” whether to participate in the activity at issue). 
 275. Cf. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (explaining how student silence during religious 
prayer functionally coerced participation in religious activity—where such silence is, 
as adopted by worshippers, a form of religious expression). 
 276. Id. 
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into partaking in the prayer.277  Operating under this analysis, 
organizations and individuals were coerced into interacting with the 
USCCB:  the USCCB is a Catholic organization, and organizations or 
individuals looking to provide or receive services pursuant to the 
TVPA were functionally coerced into interacting with or supporting 
the Catholic Church.278 
Similar to the government action of including organized prayer 
within graduation ceremonies and the government action of 
requiring an inmate to attend a religiously based narcotics program, 
the master contract between the HHS and the USCCB fails the 
coercion test and therefore is a violation of the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was intended 
to protect religious liberty by creating a separation between the 
government and religion.  The Supreme Court has specifically 
stated that putting discretionary governmental powers in the hands 
of religious bodies is a substantial breach of the separation between 
church and state. 
The issue of master contracts between government agencies and 
religious institutions, such as the one between the HHS and the 
USCCB, is one that the country will face again.  The USCCB has 
admitted its interest in forming similar contracts in the future, and 
additionally, the Massachusetts District Court emphasized that there 
can be no assurance that the type of contract challenged in ACLU of 
Massachusetts v. Sebelius will not be repeated.  Courts must address 
the Establishment Clause issue created by such contracts and they 
must articulate the constitutional problem with entering into them. 
The role of religious organizations, with regard to federal tax-
dollars, must be limited to that of subcontractors who provide social 
services pursuant to the rules and regulations of the FBCI.  Granting 
any authority to a religious institution beyond that of a 
subcontractor has the primary effect of advancing religion, 
endorsing religion, and coercing religion.  The master contracts, 
                                                          
 277. See Hanover, 626 F.3d at 13 (restating the three-step analysis in Lee, 505 U.S. 
593, and noting the Supreme Court’s holding that “silence was, in the eyes of the 
community, functionally identical to participation” in religious worship). 
 278. Cf. id. (pointing out that the Supreme Court in Lee used the two 
premises—that students were being coerced into silence during the reciting of 
the prayer and that silence was equivalent to participating in the prayer—to 
come to the conclusion that students were therefore being functionally coerced 
into participating in the prayer). 
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such as the one created between the HHS and the USCCB, violate 
all three primary Establishment Clause tests used by the Supreme 
Court and cannot be allowed. 
 
